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Abstract—We argue that quantifying software reliability is
important in demonstrating that system-level risks are As Low As
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Furthermore, we demonstrate
that such quantification is possible in at least one meaningful
case. It is, however, unlikely to be practical in every case. This
means it is unlikely to be included as an explicit objective in
standards. Hence, for those cases where software reliability can
be quantified, merely following a standard may lead to risk-
reduction opportunities being missed.
I. INTRODUCTION
One way of assessing the efficacy of standards is demon-
strating the efficacy of part, or parts, of a standard. We are
primarily interested in the design, implementation and testing
phases of software development. More specifically, we wish
to quantify the probability that software will act as specified
in its requirements.
II. QUALITATIVE APPROACHES
The efficacy of qualitative (e.g. process-based) approaches
to software development is demonstrated by the large volume
of safety-critical software in use today. However, these ap-
proaches do not allow software reliability to be quantified
in system fault trees. Whilst this lack of quantification is a
common approach, and is consistent with Aerospace Recom-
mended Practice (ARP) 4761 [1], it is not entirely benign.
Consider the simple fault tree shown in Figure 1. We assume
that element A is implemented in software and that B and C are
implemented via physical means. In this arrangement software
and a mechanical item provide mutual back-up.
Suppose that the failure rates of B and C are 10−2 and
10−5, respectively. One common approach, involves giving A,
the software component, an implausibly low failure rate (e.g.
10−31). This rate dominates the AND gate at the bottom left.
As a result, the dominant factor into the top OR gate is C’s
failure rate. Any attempts to reduce the overall failure rate will
begin by focussing on C.
Now, suppose that we were only able to justify a failure rate
of 10−2 for the software component (i.e. for A). In this case
the top OR gate is dominated by the combination of A and B.
Hence, improvements to the overall failure rate will initially
focus on these components.
This example is obviously highly simplified: the fault tree
only includes three components and, more significantly, it
A B
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Fig. 1. Example Fault Tree
is highly unlikely that decisions on which components to
“improve” will be based solely on mathematical calculations.
However, the underlying point remains valid, namely that
assuming extremely high rates of software reliability can
highlight the wrong system components1. This can lead to
scarce resources, both intellectual and physical (e.g. power
and weight budgets), being used in a sub-optimal manner,
potentially jeopardising claims that risks are ALARP.
III. QUANTIFICATION THEORIES
The quantification of software reliability is not new: quan-
tified estimates of the Sizewell B Plant Protection Software
(PPS) reliability were produced in the 1990s [2]. Despite this
history, it is not a widely used technique. This may be partly
explained by philosophical concerns (e.g. the fact that software
does not “wear out” like physical components do), which are
outside the scope of this paper. Until recently, there have also
been practical barriers to demonstrating meaningful levels of
software reliability for non-trivial cases.
One simple approach to quantifying software reliability uses
a “balls and urn” model, where individual balls represent
specific inputs and the distribution of balls represents the
distribution of inputs the software is expected to see in
1For reasons of brevity we do not fully detail the argument here, but a
similar argument shows that related problems arise if software is given an
extremely high failure rate, which is another commonly adopted approach.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
4.
75
28
v2
  [
cs
.SE
]  
7 M
ay
 20
14
operational use. Subject to certain assumptions, successfully
completing 4.61× 106 tests is sufficient to claim a reliability
of 1× 10−6 with 99% confidence [3].
Our point is not that great faith should be put in the
precise accuracy of these numbers; like all values used in fault
trees there will inevitably be some uncertainty and inaccuracy.
However, simply being able to estimate software reliability
to within, say, an order of magnitude will allow meaningful
system-level decisions to be made.
Other approaches to quantifying software reliability may
also be feasible. Consider a piece of monitoring software
that initiates “make safe” actions under certain conditions. If
the number of different inputs that meet these conditions is
suitably small (e.g. millions) then all of them may be explicitly
tested. This would allow a numerical value to be assigned to
a part of a fault tree that considered something like: “software
fails to request make safe when conditions require it”. Of
course, any safety argument that used this “partial exhaustive”
testing would also need to consider the implications of “make
safe” being enacted when it was not required.
In a small number of cases it may be possible to test the full
input domain of the software. We have recently implemented
an automated test environment, which was used to analyse
(amongst other things) a currently-fielded control algorithm.
Even a naive implementation of the test environment, running
on commodity hardware, achieved 320 test cases per second
per core2. This suggests that within 24 hours a modest 32-core
system would be capable of exhaustively testing software that
takes a combination of three 8-bit integers and three 1-bit flags.
Our experiences show that exhaustive testing of meaningful
algorithms is now within reach. Of course, it is trivially
easy to produce algorithms that cannot be exhaustively tested.
However, we conjecture that, even if exhaustive testing is
impossible, many examples of embedded software are suffi-
ciently small to allow millions of tests to be completed easily.
This opens up the possibility of providing evidence to support
statistical claims regarding software reliability.
IV. THREATS TO VALIDITY
Our focus on software testing does not cover the case where
the original requirements may be incorrect. Likewise, we have
ignored interactions between software and people.
We have also implicitly assumed that the test hardware
faithfully replicates the operational hardware, which is one
of the assumptions underpinning the relationship between the
number of successful tests and a quantified reliability claim:
recent work on emulation technologies may help demonstrate
that the required faithful replication has been achieved.
Another assumption underpinning the relationship between
estimated reliability and the number of successfully completed
tests is that the distribution of test cases accurately reflects
the software’s operational input distribution. Estimates of this
2In this case most time is spent running the test oracle, which is an animated
Vienna Development Method (VDM) specification. Running just the Software
Under Test (SUT) we can achieve around a million cases per second per core.
distribution may be informed by: discussions with stakehold-
ers [4]; development activities; and in-service data. Several
different distributions could even be used. Whilst this would
increase the number of tests it would not reach an impractical
level.
Automatically conducting large numbers of tests needs an
automated way of checking the result: that is, we need a
test oracle. In some cases this may be easy to produce
(e.g. checking a “make safe” flag, or animating a formal
specification). In others it may be more difficult to capture
the entire set of requirements in an oracle. However, even in
these cases testing could confirm, for example, that function
pre- and post-conditions are highly likely to be satisfied. This
could inform key parts of system fault trees.
There are types of software that by their very nature pose
particular problems to quantifying reliability. The lack of
knowledge of internal state information means “black box”
software is one example; real-time software is another [5].
Adapting the “balls and urn” model indicates that, for example,
4.61 million hours of testing would be required. (The move
from “number of tests” to “hours of testing” reflects the desire
to talk about “probability of failure per hour” rather than
“probability of failure per demand”.) Testing for millions of
hours is stretching the bounds of plausibility. That said, if
the software is performing a monitoring function then, as
discussed earlier, it may be possible to do a partial exhaustive
test on those input sets that require action.
V. CONCLUSION
The approaches to quantifying software reliability discussed
above will not be suitable for every piece of software. This
means they are highly unlikely to be mandated in a standard.
However, when they are suitable these methods provide valu-
able support to system-level risk management. Without this
support risk-reduction opportunities may be missed, poten-
tially jeopardising claims that risks are ALARP.
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